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RECENT FINANCIAL DEREGULATION
AND THE INTEREST ELASTICITY
OF M1 DEMAND
Yash Mehra*
Some analysts contend that the introduction na-
tionwide since 1981 of interest-bearing NOWs and
Super NOW’s has raised the interest elasticity of M1
demand. This article presents empirical evidence
consistent with this view. The demand deposit com-
ponent of Ml does not exhibit any heightened
interest-sensitivity, suggesting it is the OCD com-
ponent that has lately been more interest-sensitive.
Furthermore, it is also shown that the interest elas-
ticity of Ml demand neither changed nor was it very
high during the 1970s, a period of substantial finan-
cial innovations. This implies that it is the interest
rate deregulation, as opposed to financial innovations,
that has affected the character of M1 demand.
Introduction
It has been suggested that the introduction of
interest paying accounts such as NOWs and Super
NOWs might have raised the interest elasticity of
money demand.
1 Two interrelated reasons have been
advanced for this potential rise in interest elasticity.
First, Ml now contains assets potentially suitable for
savings. It is therefore possible that the public’s
demand for it is now more sensitive to market yields
than in the past when it was closer to a pure trans-
action aggregate. This is so because the own rate
of return on some assets like NOWs is regulated and
set below open market rates.
2 Second, NOW ac-
counts pay explicit interest but demand deposits do
not. A given change in market interest rates thus
causes a larger proportional change in the oppor-
tunity cost of holding NOWs than of holding demand
* I wish to thank Michael Dotsey, Marvin Goodfriend,
Robert L. Hetzel, John P. Judd and Thomas D. Simpson
for many helpful comments. An earlier version of the
paper was presented at the Financial Analysis Committee
Meeting held in Washington, D. C., November 22, 1985.
The views expressed in this article are not necessarily
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
1 Brayton, Farr, and Porter (1983) and Simpson (1984).
2 As of January 1986 this regulatory constraint on the
interest rate payable on NOW accounts has been
removed.
deposits.
3 As a result, changes in market rates might
induce larger changes in NOWs than in demand
deposits, thereby increasing the interest responsive-
ness of Ml as a whole as NOWs become a larger
fraction of M1.
4
3 The interest elasticity of the opportunity cost of hold-
ing  NOWs can be expressed as D (R-Rnow)(R)/(DR)
(R-Rnow), where R is the market interest rate, Rnow
is the rate offered on NOWs and A is the first difference
operator. If Rnow is fixed, then the above expression
reduces to (R/R-now). Furthermore, if Rnow is less
than R, the expression is greater than one.
4 To clarify further the second point let us express the
aggregate interest elasticity of Ml demand as the
weighted average of its component interest elasticities
where the first terms in the parentheses ECC,01, EDD,02,
and EOCD,03 are respectively the elasticities of currency,
demand deposits, and other checkable deposits with
respect to the relevant opportunity cost variables and
where the second terms (E0i,R; i=1,2,3) measure
elasticities of these opportunity cost variables with re-
spect to the market rate of interest. The opportunity
cost variable for any one component is defined as the
difference between the market interest rate and the
nominal yield paid on that component. E M1, R is the
aggregate interest elasticity of the Ml demand. The
weights in (a) are the respective shares of these com-
ponents in Ml. The component demand elasticities with
respect to the opportunity cost variables can in general
be different. Moreover, the elasticities of the opportunity
cost variables with respect to the market interest rate can
also differ from each other.
An important consideration that is relevant in deter-
mining the magnitude of the opportunity cost elasticity
of a given component in (a) is the behavior of the own
rate offered on the component asset. If the interest rate
offered on the component asset is either fixed to be zero
or strictly proportional to the market interest rate, then
the opportunity cost elasticity of that component is unity.
But consider now the case in which the explicit interest
offered on one component of Ml is regulated and kept
below the market interest rate, as was the case for the
NOWs component of the other checkable deposits. In
this case the interest elasticity of the opportunity cost
variable pertaining to that component (E03,R) can be
greater than unity. An implication of this is that even if
no change occurs in the elasticity of this component with
respect to its own opportunity cost variable (EOCD,03)
the aggregate interest elasticity of Ml demand can in-
crease simply because the share of the regulated com-
ponent in Ml grows over time, other things remaining
the same.
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mand has a bearing on how one interprets the recent
behavior of Ml velocity. Ml velocity, instead of
rising at its previous trend rate of 3 percent per year,
has remained fairly steady in the early 1980s. More-
over, whenever interest rates fell velocity has also
declined sharply. Now, if Ml demand has recently
become more sensitive to the cost of holding money,
then the observed behavior of velocity could be pre-
dictable. Interest rates, both nominal and real, have
trended downward during the last few years. Such
fall in rates increases money demand and thus lowers
velocity. Increase in money demand could be large if
interest elasticity is high. Since money affects income
with lags, velocity, conventionally measured by the
ratio of income to contemporaneous money, could
decline sharply over the short run.
The main objective of this article is to examine
whether the interest elasticity of money demand has
changed during the last few years. Now that a sub-
stantial fraction of the assets included in Ml earns
an explicit nominal return, it may no longer be
appropriate to measure the opportunity cost of hold-
ing Ml by the market interest rate. A related issue
is whether Ml demand has also become more sensi-
tive to changes in the opportunity cost variable, de-
fined as the difference between the market interest
rate and the own rate of return on Ml.
Though the focus of the present article is on the
potential behavior of the interest elasticity in the
1980s, the article also examines the behavior of this
elasticity during the 1970s, a period of substantial
financial innovation. Some analysts contend that the
interest elasticity of Ml demand might have been
high even before the financial deregulation occurred.
If that is correct, the recent strength in Ml demand
should have been predictable. The article presents
some additional evidence on this issue.
The plan of this article is as follows. Section I
presents the methodology that underlies the empirical
work reported here. Section II presents the empiri-
cal results. Section III contains the summary re-
marks. The article also contains an Appendix that
discusses some issues that arise as a result of the




A money demand regression that includes intercept
and slope dummy variables is used to examine
whether financial innovation and deregulation have
changed the parameters of the standard money de-
mand function. The estimated money demand re-
gression is
(1)
where M is nominal money balances (currency plus
total checkable deposits), y measures real income, R
is the nominal interest rate and P is the price level.
D74 and D81 are the dummy variables that equal 1
in the periods 1974:01-1980:12 and 1981:0l-1985:
03, respectively and zero otherwise. b(L), c(L), and
d(L) are polynomials in the lag operator L, defined
by L
X
s = Xt-s. Simply, polynomials in (1) imply
that current as well as past values of real income, the
interest rate, and the price level influence the demand
for real money balances. The real income- and
interest rate-interaction variables (like D74 * D1nX)
are formed by taking products of the interest rate,
real income, and the zero/one dummy variables. The
statistical significance and the signs of the estimated
coefficients on the interest rate-interaction dummy
variables in the regression (1) are used to examine
whether the interest rate elasticity has changed over
time.
The money demand regression (1) is standard in
the sense that real money demand depends only upon
real income and a nominal interest rate. However, it
differs in several ways from the form in which money
demand regressions are usually estimated. First, it is
estimated freely by simple distributed lags. It there-
fore avoids the more popular Koyck-lag specification
in which geometric lag shapes are imposed on the
distributed-lag coefficients of the independent vari-
ables. It does so because the point-estimates of long-
term income and interest elasticities could be sensitive
to restrictions imposed on the lag shapes. Second, it
enters the price level in a distributed lag form. NOW
standard theoretical models of transaction demand
for money typically assume that the price level elas-
ticity of the demand for real money balances is zero.
If this assumption is correct, the distributed-lag co-
efficients on the price level in the money demand
regression (1) should sum to zero. However, the
standard money demand theory does not say much
about the speed with which real money demand
14 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JULY/AUGUST 1986adjusts over time.6 If changes in the price level
affect the demand for money with a lag, the individ-
ual distributed-lag coefficients on the price level in
(1) would differ from zero.
The price level directly enters the money demand
regression (1). The treatment of the price level in
(1) thus differs from the one found in standard
money demand regressions based on the real-partial
adjustment hypothesis. The latter simply assumes
that prices affect real money demand without lag and
imposes this assumption on the data.
6 Third, the
money demand regression here is estimated in the
first difference form. The general use of differencing
reduces the possibility of spurious regression results.?
A recent study by Layson and Seaks (1984) con-
cluded that the first-difference version of the money
demand specification is statistically preferable to its
level form.
8
The constant term in the money demand regression
(1) captures the influence of time trend on the de-
mand for real money balances. Time trend is a proxy
variable for technological progress in the financial
system and captures, though imperfectly, the influ-
ence of changes in the cash management techniques
and other financial innovations on money demand.
9
The estimated coefficient on this variable-the con-
stant term in (1)-is generally negative, implying
that the demand for real money balances has trended
downward over time. This has determined, to some
extent, the secular upward trend in Ml velocity.
10
Some analysts contend that the introduction of inter-
5 Goodfriend (1983) has argued that the lags found in
the estimated money demand regressions could arise from
the presence of measurement errors in the relevant
independent variables.
6 Spencer (1985) presents empirical evidence that
strongly rejects the assumption that the price level affects
the demand for real money without lag. See also Gordon
(1984).
7 Granger and Newbold (1974), Plosser and Schwert
(1978), and Plosser, Schwert, and White (1982).
8 A word of caution is in order. While first differencing
does guard against spurious regression, it is not well
suited to detecting a level shift in the demand for real
money balances. For the latter, it might be useful to
consider also the level specification.
9 Lieberman (1977, 1979).
10 This point can be seen as follows. Ignoring for the
moment the dummy variables, the money demand regres-
sion estimated here can be expressed as
(9
where a1 and a2 measure respectively the long-term
income and interest rate elasticities of Ml demand and
where a0 measures the secular rate of decline in the
demand for real money balances. One can transform
this expression into the velocity growth equation. Sub-
est paying NOM’s and Super NOWs might have
blunted the more aggressive use of cash management
by the public. If that is correct, the trend growth
rate of Ml velocity could decline. This possibility is
investigated by entering also an intercept dummy
(D8l) in (1). Furthermore, several analysts have
already documented that the parameters of the money
demand regression had not been stable even over the
late 1970s.
11 Additional zero/one dummy variables,
defined from 1974 to 1980, are also included to con-
trol for the effect of financial innovations on the
parameters of the money demand function in the
1970s.
12
Suppose the inclusion in Ml of interest-bearing
assets like NOWs and Super NOWs is responsible
for the change in the interest elasticity of money
demand. If so, then one should not expect to find
any change in the interest elasticity of the old com-
ponents of Ml such as demand deposits. This impli-
cation can be tested by estimating the money demand




The various monthly money demand regressions
were estimated from 1961:0l to 1985:03. Table I
contains the regressions for Ml demand. Table II
tracting D1nY from both sides of (i) and using the result
that D1nY equals D1ny plus D1nP we can rewrite (i)
as in (ii)
(ii)
One can view (ii) as the velocity growth equation con-
sistent with the money demand equation (i). If the
long-term income elasticity is unity and if there is no
trend in the growth rate of the nominal interest rate, then
the trend in the growth rate of Ml velocity is determined
by the parameter ao. Hence, changes occurring in the
intercept of the money demand regression (i) can indicate
changes occurring in the underlying trend growth rate of
M1 velocity.
11 See, for example, Cagan and Schwartz (1975), Gold-
feld (1976), Simpson and Porter (1980), Judd and Scad-
ding (1982), and Dotsey (1983).
12 The sum of coefficients on the interest rate (real
income) variable provides an estimate of the long-term
interest (income) elasticity over the earlier period 1959-
1973. The sum of coefficients on the interest-interaction
(income-interaction) dummy variable can then be used to
test whether or not the interest rate (the income) coeffi-
cient in the relevant subperiod differs from the one in the
earlier period 1959-1973. If the sum of coefficients on the
interaction variable is statistically significant, it implies
that a shift in the long-run value of the regression coeffi-
cient has occurred over the relevant subperiod. The sign
and size of this sum would then indicate the nature and
the magnitude of the presumed shift in the parameter.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 15reports the regressions for the transaction deposits
component of Ml, with and without including other
checkable deposits in the transaction deposits. Table
III presents simulation results and actual Ml growth
from 1981:01 to 1985:03.
The Ml Demand Regressions
Three money demand regression equations are
reported in Table I. Equation (1) includes all the
intercept and slope dummy variables. Equation (2)
retains only the interest rate dummy variables, be-
cause they alone are statistically significant. Equa-
tion (3) is similar to equation (2) except that the
opportunity cost of holding money is measured as
the difference between the market interest rate and
the own rate of return on M1.
13,14
13 Each money demand regression includes the current
and lagged values of changes in the price level. In each,
the sum of the estimated distributed-lag coefficients on
These regression results suggest several inferences :
First, the interest elasticity of money demand has
increased during the last few years. The sum of
distributed-lag coefficients on the interest rate-
interaction dummy variables is negative and statisti-
cally significant (see the t values on D81 * D1nR in
equations (1) and (2), Table I). For the period
1981:0l-1985:03 these money demand regressions
yield an interest elasticity substantially higher than
the price level was not significantly different from zero.
Therefore, the coefficients are constrained to sum to
zero. This implies that the price level elasticity of
demand for real money balances. is zero. However,
several individual distributed-lag coefficients were signifi-
cant, suggesting lags in the effect of the price level on
money demand. These results are in line with the
findings reported in Spencer (1985). See the Appendix
to this article for details and further results.
14 The own rate of return on Ml was approximated by
the weighted average of the nominal returns offered on
NOWs and Super NOWs, with weights given by their
respective shares in Ml. See Cagan (1983) and Taylor
(1985) for a similar approach.
Table I
FORMAL TESTS OF A CHANGE IN MONEY DEMAND PARAMETERS,




Notes: 1n is the natural logarithm, D is the first difference operator, M is M1, R is the commercial paper rate, y is the real personal
income, P is the personal consumption expenditure deflator, and Rm is the weighted average of the rates paid on NOW and Super
NOW accounts with weights given by their relative shares in Ml. D74 and D81 are the zero/one dummy variables, taking values 1
respectively in the periods 1974-1980 and 1981-1985 and zero otherwise. D * D D1n X is formed simply by taking the product of the
zero/one dummy variable D and the X variable. The estimated coefficients on the income and interest rate variables are the
sum of the coefficients that are estimated with a simple distributed lag and therefore provide estimates of the relevant long-term
elasticities. 1ny includes 8 contemporaneous and lagged terms; 1nR, 9 such terms. The money demand regressions always included
current and three logged values of the price level, the distributed-lag coefficients on the price level constrained to sum to zero. The
regressions were estimated by the Hildreth-Lu estimation procedure. The lag lengths were chosen to maximize adjusted R
2. SER is
the standard error of regression, Rho is the first order serial correlation coefficient, and DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. Figures
in the parentheses ore the t values.
16 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JULY/AUGUST 1986that obtained from the earlier part of the sample
period.
15 Second, the contention that the public’s Ml
demand function has recently been more interest-
sensitive appears robust when one defines oppor-
tunity cost as the difference between the market rate
of interest and the own rate of return on Ml. There
is a marginal reduction in the sum of the estimated
distributed-lag coefficients on the interest rate-
differential-interaction dummy variables. But this
sum is negative and statistically significant (see the t
value on D81 * Dln(R-Rm) in equation 3, Table
I). Third, no significant shift appears to have
occurred in the income elasticity of money demand.
In fact, these money demand regressions provide
point estimates of income elasticity which are closer
to unity for most of the period studied here. Fourth,
except for a leftward shift that occurred in the
public’s demand for real money balances, these re-
gressions imply that other long-run parameters of the
Ml demand function did, not change during the 1970s
(see equation (1) in Table I). In particular, it
appears that the financial innovations of the 1970s
did not raise the interest elasticity of Ml demand
during that period.
l6 Finally, the constant term
15 Many previous studies have used two interest rates,
typically the commercial paper rate and another rate such
as the rate on time deposits. In the regressions above,
only the former variable is used. However, adding a time
deposit rate-measured here by the Fitzgerald rate-to
the above regressions does not alter the conclusion that
the interest-sensitivity of the Ml money demand function
has increased. For example, estimating the money de-
mand equation that includes the Fitzgerald rate yielded
the following regression:
Sample Period = 1969:01-1985:03 R
2 = .46
SER = .0039 Rho = .1 DW = 2.0
The sum of coefficients on the interaction terms involving
the market interest rate (R) is still negative and sta-
tistically significant, whereas the same is not true for the
other interest rate (FITZ). Since the data on the Fitz-
gerald rate are available beginning 1968, the estimation
period for this money demand regression begins in 1969.
The Fitzgerald rate is the measure of the highest effec-
tive yield available on time deposits that have usually
been subject to Regulation Q. The data on this variable
are from the Board’s Monthly Money Market Model.
16 Some analysts have suggested that financial innova-
tions might have affected the interest elasticity of money
demand in 1976, not in 1974 as assumed in this article.
This view contends that the fundamental changes occur-
ring in transactions technologies in 1974-1975 might have
affected money demand behavior in the post-1975 period.
captures the influence of a time trend on the holdings
of real money balances and is estimated to be -.002,
suggesting a secular decline of about 2.4 percent per
annum (-.002X1200) in the holdings of real money
balances. The intercept dummy D81 tests for a
change in the secular rate of decline in the demand
for real money balances. The coefficient on the
intercept dummy is .00l, which is positive but not
statistically significant at the conventional significance
levels (see t values in equations 2 and 3 in Table I).
Since the constant term in the money demand regres-
sion helps determine the trend growth rate of Ml
velocity, the low t value on the intercept dummy
variable suggests no significant shift in the under-
lying trend rate of Ml velocity. However, the abso-
lute size of the estimated coefficient on it is relatively
large, suggesting considerable caution in the con-
clusion that no change has occurred in the secular
growth rate of Ml velocity.
The Transaction Deposits Regressions
Table II reports the regressions testing for shifts
in the interest elasticity of the transaction deposits
component of Ml. Equation 2.1 excludes from trans-
actions deposits other checkable deposits component
whereas equations 2.2 and 3.1 retain them. The
latter two regressions differ in their measure of the
opportunity cost variable. In the money demand
regression that excludes other checkable deposits, the
shift variables on the interest-elasticity parameter are
not statistically significant. When other checkable
deposits are included in the transaction deposits,
however, the same shift variables on the interest-
elasticity parameters turn out to be statistically sig-
nificant (compare the t values on D81 * D1nR in
If so, then the dummy variable defined as unity over
1974-1980 might fail to detect the change in the interest
elasticity of money demand over 1976-1980. One simple
way to test the above view is to redefine the dummy
variable to be unity over 1976-1980 (DF). The money
demand regression- that includes the redefined intercept
and slope dummy variables is estimated over 1961-1980.
The estimated regression is
As can be seen, the sum of coefficients on the interest
rate-interaction dummy variables, though negative, is not
different from zero, confirming the earlier finding that
the interest elasticity of Ml demand did not increase in
the 1970s.
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DISAGGREGATED MONEY DEMAND REGRESSIONS; 1961:01-1985:03
Equation 2.1: Demand Deposits
Equation 2.2: Demand Deposits and Other Checkable Deposits
Equation 3.1: Demand Deposits and Other Checkable Deposits; Including the Proxy Variable for the
Return on Deposits
Notes: DD is demand deposits and OCD is the other checkable deposits. See Notes in Table I for an explanation of the remaining
variables.
equations 2.1 and 2.2 in Table II). Redefining the
opportunity cost variable to include the own rate of
return on money does not alter the above result,
though there is a marginal reduction in the sum of
the coefficients on the interest rate variable (the sum
of coefficients on D81 * D1n(R-Rm) is now -.08
and has a t value -2.6; see equation 3.1 in Table II).
Evidently the inclusion in Ml of NOWs and Super
NOWs increases interest-sensitivity of the Ml de-
mand function
Explaining the Actual Behavior of Ml
during the Early 1980s
Suppose the public’s Ml demand has become more
interest sensitive during the 1980s. Would this new
money demand regression be consistent with the
actual pattern of money growth observed over the
period 1981:0l-1985:03? The prediction errors that
are presented in Table III suggest a cautious yes
answer. Two sets of errors that occur in predicting
the quarterly levels and growth rates of nominal
money balances are presented. One set assumes
that the interest elasticity of money demand has not
increased during the 1980s. The money demand
regression that omits the pertinent dummy variables
is estimated over the period 1961:0l-1985:03 and
simulated within-sample over the period 1981:0l-
1985:03; the errors in predicting nominal money
balances are given in Columns Al and AZ, Table III.
The other set of errors is generated under the as-
sumption that the interest elasticity of money demand
had increased since 1981. The money demand re-
gression containing the relevant dummy variables is
estimated over the entire sample period and the esti-
mated coefficients are used to generate the sample
errors (see errors in Columns B1 and B2, Table III).
A comparative analysis of the mean and the root
mean squared error statistics clearly suggests that
the pattern of money growth predicted by this more
interest-sensitive money demand regression is not
inconsistent with the actual behavior of money growth
over the interval 1981:0l to 1985:03.
Redefining the opportunity cost variable to include
the own rate of return on Ml reduces but does not
eliminate the prediction errors over the recent period
(see Table IV). It is only under the assumption
that Ml demand is more sensitive to the interest-rate
differential that the prediction errors of the standard
money demand regression are reduced further over
the period 1981:0l-1985:03 (compare the mean and
root mean squared error statistics in Tables III and
IV).
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SIMULATION RESULTS, 1981Q1-1985Q1: PERCENTAGE ERROR IN
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-1.21 - 4.18













- .05 - .76
Mean Error 2.95 1.41 - .78 - .01
RMSE 3.91 3.30 1.27 2.52
Notes: Errors in the columns labeled Quarterly Levels are calculated as the difference between the
actual and predicted level, divided by the predicted level of nominal money balances. Errors in the
columns labeled Quarterly Changes are calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted
quarterly growth rates of nominal money balances. The predicted values-used in calculating these
errors were generated in two ways. For the errors in columns B1 and B2 the predicted values used
ore from the money demand regression 2 summarized in Table I. For the errors in columns Al and
A2 the predicted values used ore from the money demand regression 2 that was reestimated
omitting all the interest rate-interaction dummy variables; this amounts to assuming no change in
the interest elasticity of money demand over the 1980s. RMSE is the root mean squared error.
Ill.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The evidence presented here suggests that the
interest elasticity of the public’s Ml demand has in-
creased during the last few years. Furthermore, it is
the inclusion in Ml of interest-bearing assets such as
NOWs and Super NOWs which accounts for this
increase. The demand deposits component of Ml
demand does not exhibit any increased interest sensi-
tivity during the same period. Since interest rates,
both nominal and real, have trended downward
during the last few years, the strength in Ml demand
and the consequent decline in the growth rate of Ml
velocity are predictable.
As explained before, one of the reasons for the rise
in the interest elasticity of Ml demand is that the
own rate on some assets in Ml like NOWs is regu-
lated and kept below the market interest rate. A
given change in market rates thus causes a larger
proportional change in the opportunity cost of holding
NOWs. As a result, changes in market rates might
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SIMULATION RESULTS, 1981Q1-1985Q1: PERCENTAGE ERROR IN



















No Change in the A Higher Opportunity
Opportunity Cost Elasticity Cost Elasticity
of Money Demand; of Money Demand;
Within-Sample Errors Within-Sample Errors
Al A2 Bl B2
Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly
Levels Changes Levels Changes
.39 - 1.60 - .33 - 1.34
.92 2.11 - .20 .53
- .51 - 3.95 - 1.28 - 4.40
-.51 - 1.84 - 1.98 - 3.91
.04 2.26 - 1.62 1.52
- .20 - .97 - 2.33 - 2.94
.04 .98 -2.12 .84
1.74 6.96 - 1.55 2.44
2.25 2.04 - 1.93 - 1.60
3.72 5.83 - 1.23 2.93
5.15 5.59 .22 5.90
5.43 1.07 .38 .63
4.73 - 2.68 -.11 - 1.99
4.88 .58 .07 .71
5.13 .93 .49 1.72
4.93 - .75 .14 - 1.44
5.33 1.57 - .06 - .85
Mean Error 2.60 1.25 - .79 -.01
RMSE 3.47 3.10 1.24 2.49
Notes: Errors in the columns labeled Quarterly Levels ore calculated as the difference between the
actual and predicted level, divided by the predicted level of nominal money balances. Errors in the
columns labeled Quarterly Changes are calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted
quarterly growth rates of nominal money balances. The predicted values used in calculating these
errors were generated in two ways. For the errors in columns B1 and B2 the predicted values used
are from the money demand regression 3 summarized in Table 1. For the errors in columns Al and
A2 the predicted values used ore from the money demand regression 3 that was reestimated
omitting all the interest rate-interaction dummy variables; this amounts to assuming no change in
the opportunity cost elasticity of money demand over the 1980s. RMSE is the root mean squared
error.
induce larger changes in NOWs. Ml would then
appear more sensitive to interest rate swings as
NOWs become a larger fraction of Ml.
But as of January 1986 the regulatory constraint
on the rate payable on NOWs has been removed.
The rate payable on Super NOWs is already unregu-
lated. One would then expect that the own rates of
return on the interest-bearing components of Ml
would move with market interest rates. If so, the
increase observed in the interest elasticity of money
demand could fade away.
Our findings also suggest that the interest elas-
ticity of Ml demand did not change during the 1970s,
a period of substantial financial innovation. Addi-
tional work presented in the Appendix shows that for
the period 1961-1980 the interest elasticity is esti-
mated to be below other reports. Taken together,
these results further bolster the view that it is partial
financial deregulation, as opposed to financial inno-
vation, that has made Ml more responsive to market
rates during the last few years.
A word of caution is in order. The conclusion that
20 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JULY/AUGUST 1986Ml demand has become more interest sensitive must an opportunity cost variable (measured either by the
however be considered tentative, The issue of the market interest rate or by the difference between the
stability of the interest elasticity of money demand market interest rate and the own rate on Ml ). No
has been examined in the context of the standard attempt is made to check the robustness of these
money demand regression. The latter treats the findings to alternative specifications of the Ml de-
demand for real money balances as depending upon a mand function. To that extent, the results presented
scale variable (measured here by real income) and here must be treated with caution.
APPENDIX
This Appendix examines two additional questions
raised by the empirical results presented in the text.
First, why do some standard money demand regres-
sions yield very high point estimates of the interest
elasticity even for the earlier period 1960 to 1980?
Second, should one estimate the money demand re-
gressions under the assumption that the price level
has no effect on the demand for real money balances?
The interest Elasticity of Ml Demand:
Was It High or Low during the Period
1961-1980?
For the period 1961-1980 the monthly money de-
mand regressions reported here yield the point esti-
mates of the interest rate elasticity close to -.07.
They appear quite low when compared with the
estimates obtained from some standard money de-
mand regressions. The latter is estimated in level
form and includes as an explanatory variable the
lagged dependent variable.
17 Are the differences that
exist in the point estimates of interest elasticity
related to the form in which money demand regres-
sions are estimated? The results presented below
suggest this to be the case.
In order to highlight the differences between the
standard money demand regression and that esti-
mated in this article, let us first derive the standard
versions from the monthly money demand regression
(1). Ignoring for the moment the dummy variables,
the standard lagged-dependent varaible versions of
the money demand regression can be derived from the
equation (1) by imposing the following restrictions
on lag structures.
(2a)
17 For example, for almost similar sample periods the
interest elasticity is estimated to be -.13 in Judd and





Restrictions (2a) and (2b) impose geometrically de-
clining lag structures on income and interest rate
variables. Restriction (2c) has two implications:
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(1) the price level elasticity of the demand for real
money balances is zero, i.e., the sum of distributed
lag coefficients on the price level is zero; (2) the
demand for real money balances adjusts to the price
level with no lags, i.e., each of the distributed lag
coefficients on the price level is zero. Restriction
(2e) amounts to assuming that time trend has no
influence on the holdings of real money balances.
Substituting (2a), (2b), (2c) and (2e) into (l),
ignoring dummy variables, yields the money demand
regression (3a).
(3a)
Alternatively, (3a) could be expressed as follows:
(3b)
The money demand regression (3b), popularly
known as the real-partial adjustment model of money
demand, is one of the lagged dependent variable
18 Mehra (1978) and Spencer (1985).
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 21versions of the standard money demand function.
Another version, known as the nominal partial ad-
justment model of money demand, is obtained if we
assume that lags do exist in the adjustment of real
money balances to changes in the price level. But
we retain the assumptions that the long-run price
level elasticity of the demand for real money balances
is zero and that the lag shape on the price level vari-
able is geometric. These assumptions imply that
d(L) follows the restriction (2d). Substituting (2a),
(2b), (2d) and (2e) into (1) yields the following:
mates of the interest elasticity are also sensitive to
the exclusion of the time trend variable. This sug-
gests that high estimates of the interest elasticity
derived from some level versions of the standard
money demand regression are not robust and must
be treated with considerable caution.
Testing the Price Level Elasticity Assumption
(4)
The money demand regressions (3b) and (4) and
As stated before, the simple theoretical models of
the transaction demand for money imply that the
price level eIasticity of the demand for real money
balances is zero. In estimating the money demand
regressions this restriction on the price level elasticity
has been imposed on the data, i.e., the coefficients on
the price level are constrained to sum to zero.
their level versions were estimated over the common Does relaxing the constraint on the price level
sample period 1961-1980. They were also estimated elasticity alter any of the conclusions about the
with a time trend. Presented in Table V are the interest elasticity of Ml demand ? Table VI reports
estimates of the interest elasticity of money demand. the regressions pertinent to answer that question.
They show that the estimates of the interest elasticity Equation 6.1 is the money demand regression that
that are obtained from the level versions of the stan- includes all the relevant intercept and slope dummy
dard money demand regression are substantially variables but is estimated without imposing the con-
higher than the ones obtained from the relevant first- straint that the coefficients on the price level sum to
difference versions. In the level versions the esti- zero. Equation 6.2 is similar to Equation 6.1 except
Table V
INTEREST ELASTICITIES OF THE STANDARD MONTHLY





Time Trend Excluded Time Trend Included





- .03 - .02
- .03 - .04




The regressions are estimated by the Hildreth-Lu estimation procedure. TT is time trend. For an
explanation of the variables see the Notes in Table 1.
22 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JULY/AUGUST 1986Table VI
FORMAL TESTS OF A CHANGE IN MONEY DEMAND PARAMETERS ESTIMATED
WITHOUT IMPOSING THE PRICE LEVEL ELASTICITY CONSTRAINT
ON THE DATA; 1961:01-1985:03
Equation 6.1
Sum of Coefficients on the Price level = -.20
(- 1.2)
Equation 6.2
Notes: All variables are as defined before. For the price level variable the individual coefficients are reported. See Notes in Table I for
other details.
that it uses the alternative measure of the opportunity
cost variable. The sum of coefficients on the income-
interaction dummy variables is generally insignificant
as before, but the sum of coefficients on the interest
rate-interaction dummy variables though insignificant
over 1974-1980 is not so over 1981:0l-1985:03 (see
t values on these variables in Table VI). As regards
the price level constraint the sum of coefficients on
the price level is -.20 with a t value -1.2, sug-
gesting that this sum is statistically not different from
zero. However, the individual coefficients on the
price level are statistically different from zero (see
Table VI). These results suggest that the theoretical
restriction on the price level elasticity is in con-
formity with the data and that relaxing this con-
straint does not alter any of the conclusions about
the interest elasticity of Ml demand. The results
also show that the demand for real money balances
adjusts to the price level with lags, suggesting that
the real partial adjustment version of the standard
money demand regression is inconsistent with the
data.
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